Attitudes and existing policy positions

Informal Public Transport performs a valuable role in the cities of Sub-Saharan Africa, but suffers from a negative image that has even led to city-wide bans on some occassions. Changing attitudes towards the industry, and the introduction of positive policy positions and frameworks, are required in order to maximise benefits and reduce the problems that do occur.

Background

The attitudes of public authorities towards Informal Public Transport (IPT), and the policy positions they adopt, can vary considerably. Decisions can be taken to prohibit IPT, banning informal transport services for reasons that can include the desire to reduce competition for formal public transport. Public authorities may also seek to co-opt IPT within formal Public Transport (PT) structures, denying operating licenses for those not satisfied with conditions offered. For example, during the summer 2020, a general ban was imposed on IPT operations in Harare, Zimbabwe. The national government required that operators affiliate with the state-owned PT entity Zupco. Some operators decided to affiliate with Zupco, while others remain outside this system and are deemed illegal. Many public authorities choose to recognise and regulate IPT to some degree, with common approaches including route licensing and fare setting, as is the case in the TRANSITIONS case studies. Another approach is that of acceptance, where IPT operates with minimal governmental oversight or intervention. [2] Whether this latter option is the result of a conscious decision or limited public resources is not always clear.

Regardless of the formal policy position, circumstances can (and often do) intervene with the result that official policy objectives are not realised and IPT continues to operate in a situation of ineffectual regulation. This dynamic has been captured in the idea of a ‘regulatory cycle’, whereby public authorities seek to introduce formal public transport, but long-term viability issues result in insufficient capacity and poor service quality.

IPT operators emerge to fill the service gaps, but aggressive competition and poor regulatory oversight result in congestion, pollution and poor road safety. This results in the situation that the public authority considers it should take action and the cycle can be seen to start again (see Figure). The author of the cycle concept, Gwilliam [3], referred to efforts by governments in Accra, Lagos and Dakar to recreate publically owned companies (as in Accra) or by subsidizing and protecting a selected private company (as in Dakar). While other observers have argued that the cycle is not necessarily a sequential process in the context of all cities [4], the compromised implementation of the Aayalolo Bus Service in Accra in 2016 does serve to highlight some of the difficulties faced where major formal PT schemes are proposed, which include competition from trotros operating along the same corridor. Findings from TRANSITIONS interviews suggest that regulatory enforcement of IPT in Accra has weakened over time, with the result that further informalisation (including illegal operations), and a drift into phases 2 and 3 are evident.[5]

A central objective of the TRANSITIONS project has been to understand what options could exist to break this cycle. The idea of IPT reform and integration with formal public transport networks is not new, but sharing existing examples of better practice and lessons learnt is important, as could be a shift in attitude and greater emphasis on support for and bottom-up professionalisation of the sector.

Comparison of situations and perspectives from the TRANSITIONS cities

The TRANSITIONS cities represent a range of situations with respect to the maturity of the framework created for IPT, in relation to both: regulating the industry; and supporting the professionalisation of the industry.

Cape Town can be viewed as one of the ‘first movers’ in SSA and a combination of national and local public authority actions has resulted in a relatively well-developed framework of both regulation and supportive initiatives for IPT. Operational licences for specific routes form the basis of regulation, while the national government specifies safety standards for vehicles. Complementing this, the national government has also led the development and funding of the Taxi Recapitalisation Programme (TRP), a partial capital subsidy that enables IPT operators to scrap old vehicles and purchase new replacements. The existence of a relatively extensive formal PT system, including both trains and Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) has encouraged efforts for IPT integration through trialling different forms of ‘hybridity regulation’. While there have been important achievements, including the modernisation of a portion of the minibus fleet, substantial problems remain, not least as a result of the intense competition amongst IPT operators for passengers and the violent reactions that can sometimes result.

IPT regulation in Maputo originated in 1989 and much more recently, the Municipality of Maputo has been promoting a shift to use of larger vehicles (than the current 15 seater chapas minibuses) through its annual licensing process. In relation to enforcement, this is sometimes strong, but also unfair. IPT associations interviewed expressed that operators are placed under considerable pressure by municipal police, who are considered to take advantage of regulations to their own benefit. Payment of bribes appears to be common place.

In the case of the Ghanaian cities, the fundamental element of IPT regulation in the form of route licensing is in place. National government regulations mean that IPT operators in Accra and Kumasi should register with a union and then apply to the local administration for the rights to operate along a specific route. Poor enforcement has, however, led to a situation where some interviewees consider that unregistered ‘floater’ operators (known locally in Kumasi as waawaa), outnumber legitimate operators. This means that those trotro operators that do seek to ‘play by the rules’, for example by queueing at terminals, can become disadvantaged. Industry stakeholders expressed that the public authorities show little interest towards the industry and as a result there are limited support actions.

When asked the question, Who are the main stakeholders in the trotro industry, a Union representative in Ghana responded “The government does not have anything doing in our industry.” Drivers, owners and union executives have the feeling that the government does not listen to their concerns and/or address their plights.

Of the case cities involved in TRANSITIONS, Freetown could be considered closest to the ‘open market’ and position of ‘acceptance’ by public authorities. The balance of power in favour of self-management and regulation by unions appears to have been most prominent here, but the government is currently in the process of establishing policies and subsequent actions in relation to the IPT industry.

Further details and commentary on regulatory frameworks currently in place in the cities are provided here.

Main findings and messages

The attitudes of public authorities towards Informal Public Transport (IPT), and the policy positions they adopt, can vary considerably. Decisions can be taken to prohibit IPT, banning informal transport services for reasons that can include the desire to reduce competition for formal public transport. Public authorities may also seek to co-opt IPT within formal Public Transport (PT) structures, denying operating licenses for those not satisfied with conditions offered. For example, during the summer 2020, a general ban was imposed on IPT operations in Harare, Zimbabwe.

The national government required that operators affiliate with the state-owned PT entity Zupco. Some operators decided to affiliate with Zupco, while others remain outside this system and are deemed illegal. Many public authorities choose to recognise and regulate IPT to some degree, with common approaches including route licensing and fare setting, as is the case in the TRANSITIONS case studies. Another approach is that of acceptance, where IPT operates with minimal governmental oversight or intervention. Whether this latter option is the result of a conscious decision or limited public resources is not always clear.

Regardless of the formal policy position, circumstances can (and often do) intervene with the result that official policy objectives are not realised and IPT continues to operate in a situation of ineffectual regulation. This dynamic has been captured in the idea of a ‘regulatory cycle’, whereby public authorities seek to introduce formal public transport, but long-term viability issues result in insufficient capacity and poor service quality.

IPT operators emerge to fill the service gaps, but aggressive competition and poor regulatory oversight result in congestion, pollution and poor road safety. This results in the situation that the public authority considers it should take action and the cycle can be seen to start again.

A central objective of the TRANSITIONS project has been to understand what options could exist to break this cycle. The idea of IPT reform and integration with formal public transport networks is not new, but sharing existing examples of better practice and lessons learnt is important, as could be a shift in attitude and greater emphasis on support for and bottom-up professionalisation of the sector.

Endnotes

Fortune, G., 2021 (Draft – forthcoming) Informal Transportation & Decarbonization V1.4 – paper refers to an ambitious and crude attempt to size the Informal Transport sector in SSA, based on available information from 25 locations (cities and countries). The information is not consistent in terms of the forms of ‘informal transport’ included in the total figure. For example, in some cases motorcycles or taxis were excluded.
Categories of policy positions based on Cervero, 2000. Informal transport in the developing world. UN-Habitat.
A summary of the ‘regulatory cycle’, as conceptualised and described by Gwilliam, 2008. Bus transport: Is there a regulatory cycle? Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 42, 1183–1194. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2008.05.001.
See for example: Wilkinson, P., 2010. The regulatory cycle stalled? An assessment of current institutional obstacles to regulatory reform in the provision of road-based public transport in Cape Town, South Africa. Research in Transportation Economics 29, 387–394. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.retrec.2010.07.049; and Finn, B., Mulley, C., 2011. Urban bus services in developing countries and countries in transition: A framework for regulatory and institutional developments. JPT 14, 89–107. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5038/2375-0901.14.4.5.
Durant et al., 2022 (forthcoming), Re-evaluating roles and relationships between city authorities and informal public transport operators in Sub-Saharan Africa: a comparative analysis of five cities. Undergoing peer review.